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Abstract
We study how institutional design influences moral transgression.
People are heterogeneous in their feelings of guilt and can share guilt
with others. Institutions determine the number of supporters necessary
for immoral outcomes to occur. With more supporters required, ev-
ery supporter can share guilt more easily. This facilitates becoming a
supporter. Conversely, an institution requiring more supporters must
rely on people who have higher individual moral standards. We analyze
individual thresholds for agreeing to a transgression, depending on the
available options for sharing guilt by institutional design. On the ag-
gregate level, we study how institutions affect the likelihood of immoral
outcomes.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the critical role of institutions in affecting moral behav-
ior. Specifically, we aim at understanding how several people acting together
may promote or prevent moral transgression. Many immoral acts require the
support of several people to become implementable. On the one hand, this
may put a natural barrier on moral transgression: If not just the worst people
in a population, but also a considerable fraction of “ordinary people” have
to participate, transgression may lack support and hence be prevented. On
the other hand, for the individual, knowing that he or she is just one out of
many people, may facilitate supporting moral transgression: Acting together
with others allows for sharing guilt, for feeling less responsible for immoral
outcomes, and for lowering the impression of breaking a social norm (compare
Latane´ and Nida (1981)). Thus, if many have to be supportive for transgres-
sion to happen, transgression may occur exactly because of this necessity. It
is this tension our paper aims to explore. Depending on how many people
have to participate by institutional design, moral transgression may occur or
be prevented.
Morally difficult tasks are often delegated to several people instead of one
individual alone. An example are executions by shooting, where typically
several people act together in a shooting squad. Similarly, death penalties are
often executed by so-called execution teams who inject lethal doses of toxic
drugs together. In his book “On Killing”, Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman
(1996) points out that individual barriers towards morally problematic activity
often break when people act together with others: “The individual is not a
killer, but the group is” (p. 149). Yet if sharing guilt with others facilitates
participating in morally difficult activity, the amount of supporters necessary
becomes an important design tool for institutions.
Research in social psychology suggests that people engage in “psychosocial
manoeuvres – often aided by the institutions [...], which absolve them from
moral responsibility for harmful acts” (Haidt and Kesebir, 2010, p. 812). Put
differently, moral behavior is malleable, and institutional design affects levels
of immoral behavior in people. Even for the most drastic atrocity, some histo-
rians stress the role of institutional design facilitating participation (compare
Browning (2004) on the organization of the Holocaust). This paper focuses
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on the role of group absolution and shared guilt, and how institutional design
affects immoral behavior if people share their guilt with others.
We focus on two measures of immorality: Firstly, moral transgression can
happen on an individual level. If a person would be willing to support trans-
gression in one institution, but not in the other, institutions affect this person’s
moral disposition. Secondly, institutions affect outcomes. If transgression re-
quires the collaboration of several people, feelings of guilt are reduced in those
who collaborate. Yet for the transgression to materialize, enough supporters
have to share in. Therefore, we also study the likelihood of transgression to
materialize as a second measure of immorality within a population.
Our game-theoretic model can be understood as an extension of a discrete
public goods game as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984). In our model, a group
of agents faces the opportunity to commit a morally problematic act (this is,
ironically, the “public good” in our case). Agents would enjoy the outcome of
the act, focusing on some selfish benefit. Yet committing the act is associated
with feelings of guilt for those who supported it actively. If a sufficiently large
group of agents acts as supporters, moral transgression happens. We assume
that the associated individual feelings of guilt are decreasing in the number of
supporters.
We analyze the following factors influencing immoral outcomes: Firstly, we
vary the degree to which guilt diffuses. Secondly, we study the impact of the
number of supporters necessary for moral transgression to happen. Thirdly,
we analyze the effect of the overall population size. Varying the number of
required supporters could be interpreted as changing the decision rule in an
organization, e.g., from unanimity voting to a simple majority vote, or to
looking for a volunteer. Varying group size can be interpreted as shifting re-
sponsibility for a particular decision upwards or downwards in the hierarchy of
a larger organization. Likewise, our results can be understood as a comparison
of existing institutions.
Our findings can be summarized as follows: We observe that if transgression
requires unanimity within the population, sufficiently large groups either end
up in a moral or in an immoral state, depending on the distribution of indi-
vidual levels of guilt within the population and depending on how easily guilt
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diffuses among many. While, individually, people find it easier to participate
in transgression within a large population, transgression may be completely
prevented if there are enough people having substantial moral concerns. Fur-
thermore, we find that the probability for transgression to happen is U -shaped
in the population size for many common distributions of individual levels of
guilt. The initial decrease is driven by the same effect which drives the trans-
gression probability to zero in a model without sharing of guilt: In a larger
group, more have to agree and thus the probability that someone will object is
high. As the group gets even larger, this effect is overruled by another one. If
very many have to agree guilt is shared so effectively that it becomes negligible.
We then move away from unanimity and study the effects of varying the num-
ber of required supporters on individual and outcome-based immorality. In-
dividual willingness to support transgression increases monotonically in the
number of required supporters since guilt can be shared. Yet the probabil-
ity that transgression materializes first decreases in the number of required
supporters, but increases in this number if the overall number of required sup-
porters is large. Thus transgression can best be prevented if an intermediate
number of supporters is necessary. In such a situation, people with higher
moral concerns would have to collaborate. Yet such people have an incentive
to free-ride on others: They prefer to enjoy the fruits of an action without hav-
ing to do the dirty work themselves. Put differently, simple majority voting
tends to be more successful at preventing transgression than both unanimity
voting and looking for a volunteer.
Furthermore, we study effects of population size if the number of supporters
required is fixed. We observe an effect of “immoral overshooting”: As the
population grows large, many people find it easy to support transgression even
though their support is not required at all.
Besides shared guilt, one may think of other factors lowering levels of guilt in
people. For example, guilt may be larger if people know that their support
was pivotal in the sense that if they had opted out, the moral transgression
would not have materialized. In an extension, we therefore study such aspects
of pivotality in isolation and in combination with effects of shared guilt. Our
techniques and most of our results extend to both settings.
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In the main part of the paper, we assume that guilt is driven by outcomes:
People do not feel guilty if they supported an immoral action that never mate-
rialized. This is in line with the basic concept of guilt in western law systems,
and it corresponds to a utilitarian view of morality. Motivated by a rule-
based, e.g. Kantian, moral conception, we also study an extension in which
guilt is driven by supporting immoral actions no matter whether the transgres-
sion realizes or not. In the latter model, we observe the following transition:
An equilibrium in which moral trangression occurs with a positive probability
exists only if selfish “benefits” from transgression are sufficiently large.
Finally, we show that there is a non-trivial strategic equivalence between our
model and a more standard public goods model without any diffusion of guilt.
Hence, our results inform us about standard public goods games with het-
erogeneous, private voting costs as well, and generate new insights for these
models, too.
Related Literature
We add to the literature in several ways: Previous applications of discrete pub-
lic good games to morals and collective action focus mostly on the bystander
effect.1 Our model differs from this line of research in that the “public good”
is an immoral outcome and not a moral one. Accordingly, we incorporate the
psychological costs of guilt instead of the physical costs of doing a good deed.
Thus, our work is more closely related to Huck and Konrad (2005) who also
consider a trade-off between the costs and benefits of a moral transgression.
The key difference between our model and theirs is the inclusion of diffusion
of costs/guilt as the number of supporters increases. This assumption is very
much in line with findings from social psychology, for an overview see Fischer
(2011), and leads to significant changes in the model’s qualitative behavior.
Moreover, while Huck and Konrad mostly focus on varying the population size
(or, equivalently, the size of the deciding committee), our analysis considers a
broader set of questions. For instance, varying the size of required supporters
1The bystander effect describes the phenomenon that helping a person in distress be-
comes less likely the more people are around and could in principle help the victim, see
e.g. Latane´ and Nida (1981). The game-theoretic literature on the bystander effect includes
Harrington (2001), Osborne (2004) and Crettez and Deloche (2011), see the last paper for
more references.
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has – to our knowledge – only been studied in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984)
while most of the literature considers the more tractable cases of one required
supporter or unanimity. In addition, our model differs by assuming incomplete
information over heterogeneous costs instead of the symmetric complete infor-
mation case considered by Palfrey and Rosenthal and the subsequent literature
cited above.
On a technical level, our model is also related to models of strategic voting
and committee decision making.2 What sets our model apart from this liter-
ature are the costs of voting, as in our study, individual costs of an immoral
“vote” decrease in the number of supporters. Moreover, our study addresses
a different topic: While that literature centers around questions of efficiency
and information aggregation, our main interest lies in characterizing conditions
that promote or limit immoral dispositions and outcomes.
A word is in order on what motivates our conception of guilt caused by agreeing
to an immoral activity and how this conception of guilt differs from other
conceptions in the economics literature: We study a context in which it is not
debatable that the immoral act violates basic ethical standards. Participants
decide about supporting moral transgression at a cost of bad conscience. Such
moral transgression may for example refer to harming (or refusing to help)
a third party. Motivated by results from social psychologists such as Latane´
and Nida, we assume that it is salient that such harm and damage is immoral,
and focus on the mere impacts of shared guilt and group absolution. In other
words, it is not determined by the expectations of the victim what behavior
is morally right or wrong. Yet motivated by findings on the bystander effect,
we assume that when several people commit a moral transgression together,
people have less difficulty in agreeing to harm (or not help) a victim. Such
group absolution may arise from an impact of other’s beliefs on how bad the
immoral activity is, or from a diffusion of responsibility.
A strand of literature in economics has considered feelings of guilt that are
caused by shortcoming the expectations of other individuals. For example, in
the dictator game, if the game partner expects to receive a certain amount,
2For seminal contributions to that literature, see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)
or Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997). Li and Suen (2009) provide a recent survey.
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behaving selfishly causes feelings of guilt due to not fulfilling the partner’s ex-
pectations (compare, e.g., Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), Battigalli, Char-
ness, and Dufwenberg (2013) and the references therein). This definition of
guilt is motivated by psychological research looking at a social relationship
to a partner (compare, e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton, 1994), but
not to a third party (such as a victim). For seminal work on incorporating
the fulfillment of other’s beliefs into a social game, see Geanakoplos, Pearce,
and Stachetti, 1989. Such work gives a micro basis for the assumption that
guilt diffuses within a group of activists. Works such as Be´nabou and Tirole
(2011) take this microscopic approach one step further, focusing on a single
agent’s internal conflict - including guilt. Our approach is more mesoscopic in
nature: We take diffusion of guilt as a given and study its consequences on the
decisions of medium-size groups, i.e., groups which are small enough to still
let the individuum count.
In a recent study, Falk and Szech (2013a) find that deciding individually about
harming a third party prevents immoral behavior compared to two people de-
ciding together. People decide between saving the life of a mouse and foregoing
some monetary amount versus agreeing to kill a mouse and receiving money.
In the bilateral situation, people find it much easier not to save the life of a
mouse than in the individual decision context. Knowing that another person
has to support the killing, people care less about the mouse life and opt for the
money, too. This happens even though people know they remain fully pivotal
for the death of the mouse.3
Sobel (2010) addresses the effects of diffused pivotality in markets in a theoret-
ical study. Market participants act less pro-socially, knowing that their effect
is small in a group of many traders. In an experimental study, Falk and Szech
(2013b) show that diffusion of pivotality can indeed drive people to support
immoral acts. Other mechanisms leading to “unfair” or less social outcomes
are delegation or moral “wiggle rooms”. These are discussed, e.g., in Bartling
and Fischbacher (2012), Hamman, Loewenstein and Weber (2010) and Dana,
Weber and Kuang (2007).
3Another difference between the individual and the bilateral context was that the bilateral
context used a market frame. People negotiated in the roles of “seller” and “buyer”. While
the study cannot disentangle what drove immoral activity exactly, it provides a strong
indication that sharing guilt lowers moral costs.
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The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce our model, prove
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, and define the individual and the
outcome-based measures of morality used throughout. Section 3 focuses on ef-
fects of different levels of diffusion of guilt. In Section 4, we analyze the effects
of institutions on individual moral thresholds and aggregate moral outcomes.
Section 4.1 focuses on effects of the number of supporters necessary for trans-
gression to happen, while Section 4.2 analyzes the effects of population size.
Section 5 discusses extensions: direct costs of pivotality, heterogeneous bene-
fits from the transgression and outcome-independent guilt. Section 6 compares
our model to a standard model without sharing of guilt. Section 7 concludes.
2 Framework
This section introduces our model. We show existence and uniqueness of
equilibrium. Furthermore, we introduce our measures of morality: Individ-
ual thresholds characterize at which personal level of moral concerns people
get tempted by institutions to agree to transgression. The transgression prob-
ability P , instead, focuses on outcomes. It describes the likelihood with which
moral transgression materializes within a population.
2.1 The Model
We consider a group of n ≥ 1 agents who face the decision to take an action.
We assume that taking the action is morally difficult. We thus also refer to it as
the moral transgression. If transgression happens, each agent receives V > 0,
otherwise each agent receives 0. Transgression is associated with costs of feeling
guilty afterwards, or with some general “moral costs”, which are modeled as
follows: Each agent has a private type xi. Types are drawn independently
from a commonly-known, continuous distribution function F with F (0) =
0 whose density function f is strictly positive over the support (0, a), a ∈
(0,∞] of F . If agent i supported the transgression and the transgression
indeed takes place, his or her moral costs are xi divided by s(y) where y is the
number of agents who supported the transgression. The division by s captures
sharing, or diffusion, of guilt. For example, s(y) ≡ 1 corresponds to a standard
public goods game without sharing of guilt. s(y) = y captures a proportional
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diffusion of guilt. We assume that s is weakly increasing and that s(1) = 1. If
transgression does not materialize, we assume that agents do not feel guilty.4
Agents who did not support the transgression do not feel guilty either.
The collective decision process is modeled as a voting-type game. Agents
simultaneously “vote” either “Yes” or “No”. If at least k agents vote “Yes”,
transgression happens. k ∈ {1, . . . , n} is commonly known. This game can be
interpreted as the result of a decision rule that was prescribed or agreed upon
beforehand. Alternatively, it can be thought of as a game of volunteering to
participate in an immoral action, and k as the minimum number of volunteers
needed to carry it out.
To sum up, the realized utility of agent i from supporting immoral activity
(opting for “Yes”) is given by(
V − xi
s(1 + Y−i)
)
1{Y−i≥k−1} (1)
where Y−i denote the number of agents other than i who collaborated as well.
Realized utility from opting against transgression (choosing “No”) is given by
V 1{Y−i≥k}. (2)
2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
The solution concept we employ is Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We focus on
equilibria which are symmetric in the sense that agents with the same type take
the same moral decision. For k > 1 there exists a pooling equilibrium where all
agents choose “No” regardless of their type and where all agents have a utility
of 0. As is common, e.g., in the voting-games and matching literatures, we
ignore this equilibrium in the following and focus on the Pareto-superior equi-
libria where the immoral action is taken with positive probability.5 Our first
main result shows that there always exists exactly one equilibrium of this type.
4See Sections 5 and 6 for extensions.
5Since agents can guarantee themselves a non-negative payoff by voting “No”, all agents
earn a non-negative payoff in any equilibrium. Any agent strictly preferring “Yes” in an
equilibrium where the immoral action is taken with positive probability must earn a strictly
positive expected payoff.
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Proposition 1. There exists a unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in
which transgression happens with positive probability. In this equilibrium, agent
i opts for “Yes” if xi ≤ θk,n and for “No” if xi > θk,n. θk,n is the unique solu-
tion of
V b(n− 1, k − 1, F (θk,n)) =
n−1∑
j=k−1
θk,n
s(1 + j)
b(n− 1, j, F (θk,n)), (3)
where
b(n, j, p) =
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j.
If k < n, θk,n lies in the interior of the support of F , F (θk,n) ∈ (0, 1) and thus
the equilibrium is a separating equilibrium.
Equation (3) has a straightforward interpretation in terms of the costs and
benefits of a marginal agent: On the left hand side we have the gains in utility
if the agent is indeed marginal, i.e., if exactly k − 1 other agents are willing
to take action. On the right hand side we find the expected costs of an agent
with type θk,n.
Obviously, uniqueness only holds up to the decision of agents with type θk,n
which are indifferent between “Yes” and “No”. We ignore this technicality
in the following, since it only concerns zero-probability events. For k = n,
(3) becomes θn,n = s(n)V . Thus, for F with finite support, the equilibrium
degenerates to a pooling equilibrium where all agents opt for “Yes” if n or V
are sufficiently large.
2.3 Measures of Moral Transgression
We focus on two different measures of moral transgression: θk,n captures in-
dividual levels of immorality. Pk,n refers to immoral outcomes within the
population.
Immorality can increase on an individual level, in the sense that an individual
with given moral standards may get tempted by possibilities to share guilt via
institutional design. We measure this institutional effect on the individual level
by the quantity θk,n, i.e., by the marginal type who supports the transgression.
For an individual decision-maker, we have θ1,1 = V , i.e., the decision-maker
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agrees whenever the benefits V are larger than his or her individual guilt x.
In general, θk,n may be both, smaller or larger than V . In some cases, agents
who would have supported the transgression individually, opt against it in a
different institution, hoping that others will step in. Thus, a free-riding-type
effect may dominate. In other cases, agents who would not have supported
the transgression individually may opt in its favor in a different institutional
context, tempted by effects of shared guilt.
In addition, as an outcome-based measure of morality, we consider the equi-
librium probability Pk,n with which transgression occurs within a population
Pk,n =
n∑
j=k
b(n, j, F (θk,n)).
For an individual decision-maker, we have P1,1 = F (V ), i.e., the transgression
probability equals the proportion of individual supporters in the population.
As we will see in the following, the dependence of Pk,n on k and n is rather
intricate. For instance, Pn,n, the transgression probability under unanimous
decisions converges either to 0 or to 1, depending on the interplay of the
distribution F and the sharing rule s.
3 Diffusion of Guilt
In this section, we study transgression probabilities in decisions made under
unanimity. This allows to focus on the interplay between the distribution of
moral standards within a population and the degree to which guilt can be
shared. We show that except for knife-edge cases the transgression probability
Pn,n converges either to 0 or 1 and give explicit conditions for both cases. We
also show that for several common distribution functions, Pn,n is U -shaped in
n.
We assume that for moral transgression to materialize, it has to be unani-
mously supported among the agents, i.e., k = n. Hence agents have no in-
centive to free-ride on each other. We assume that the sharing function is of
the form s(y) = yα with α > 0. α captures the degree to which guilt can be
shared.6 We focus on the interplay between diffusion of guilt α, population
6With some technical effort, the results can be extended to functions s which behave like
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size n and distribution of moral concerns F .
If guilt diffuses easily, i.e., if α is large, it is easier to bear the burden of agreeing
to the transgression. Accordingly, both of our measures of immorality increase
in α.
Lemma 1.
θn,n = n
αV and Pn,n = F (n
αV )n (4)
are increasing in α.
From the lemma, we see that θn,n increases also in n. The dependence of Pn,n
on n is less obvious in general. We begin with some simple observations:
Corollary 1.
(i) If α = 0 and F (V ) < 1, Pn,n converges exponentially quickly to 0 in n.
(ii) If α > 0 and F has finite support, Pn,n = 1 for sufficiently large n.
Thus, for α = 0, i.e. without sharing of guilt, Pn,n vanishes exponentially
quickly in n, whenever some types reject the moral transgression on an indi-
vidual level, F (V ) < 1.7 In contrast, under sharing of guilt, Pn,n will take the
value 1 for sufficiently large n if the support of F is finite.
A finite support means that there exists a commonly-known maximum-possible
level of individual guilt. If such a maximum-possible level of guilt is unknown
or infinite, the support of F is infinite. Proposition 2 and 3 characterize the
behavior of Pn,n in this more general case. We show that while Pn,n → 0 is the
rule without sharing of guilt, it only arises for very heavy-tailed distributions F
if guilt can be shared easily. Thus, under sharing of guilt, in a large population
moral transgression happens very likely.
Proposition 3 shows that there is a sharp dichotomy between heavy-tailed dis-
tributions F for which Pn,n converges to 0, and light-tailed distributions for
which Pn,n converges to 1. The intuition for this finding is as follows: As the
population becomes larger, sharing guilt becomes easier. Yet the person with
the strongest feelings of guilt out of the population is going to be a stricter and
yα for large y.
7If F (V ) = 1, it seems safe to assert that we are not speaking of a moral transgression.
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stricter moralist. If F has a sufficiently heavy tail, the latter effect dominates.
In a first step, we characterize the boundary case of distributions for which
Pn,n is constant, i.e., distributions for which the transgression probability is
independent of population size n.
Proposition 2. Assume α > 0 and let F (x) = exp(−βx− 1α ) where β =
−V 1α log(q) for some q ∈ (0, 1). Then Pn,n = q for all n.
The distribution F in the proposition is the so-called Fre´chet distribution8
whose density is given by
f(x) =
β
α
exp(−βx− 1α ) x− 1+αα .
For large x, the behavior of this density function is dominated by the power
decay x−
1+α
α . Proposition 3 shows that power decay of order 1+α
α
marks indeed
the boundary between distributions for which the transgression happens or
does not happen in large populations.
Proposition 3.
(i) If limx→∞ x
1+α
α f(x) = 0, then limn→∞ Pn,n = 1
(ii) If limx→∞ x
1+α
α f(x) =∞, then limn→∞ Pn,n = 0.
The boundary case is thus a certain power decay and the critical power in-
creases in the degree α to which guilt can be shared. If the tail of F is lighter
than x−
1+α
α , we are in case (i) of the proposition, if it is heavier we are in case
(ii). If guilt is shared proportionally, α = 1, the critical power is given by
1+α
α
= 2. Since distributions with heavier tails than x−2 are rarely observed in
applications9, we can expect to be typically in case (i) of the proposition. In
contrast, if we consider intermediate levels of guilt-sharing such as α = 0.2, we
find a critical power of 1+α
α
= 6 and, accordingly, there are important classes
of distributions F for which either Pn,n → 1 or Pn,n → 0.
8The Fre´chet distribution is best-known as a stable limiting distribution of rescaled first
order statistics in extreme value theory, see, e.g., Chapter 22 of Johnson, Kotz and Balakr-
ishnan (1994). Thus it is not surprising that this class of distributions arises here: Pn,n ≡ q
can be understood as a stability property of first order statistics.
9See Clauset, Shalizi and Newman (2009) who also give many empirical examples of
power decays with an exponent between 2 and 3.
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We close this section by showing that for many common distribution func-
tion, exponential distributions and power distributions, the sequence Pn,n is
U -shaped: Under unanimity voting and proportional sharing of guilt α = 1,
the smallest transgression probability occurs at some intermediate population
size.
Proposition 4. Assume that α = 1 and that F is either an exponential
or a power distribution, i.e., F (x) = 1 − e−cx for some c > 0 with density
f(x) = ce−cx, or, F (x) = 1 − bγ
(x+b)γ
for some b, c > 0, γ > 1 with density
f(x) = γb
γ
(x+b)γ+1
. Then, for sufficiently small V , Pn,n is decreasing up to some
unique and finite n0 > 1 and increasing from there on.
The (fairly technical) proof contains an explicit criterion which allows to check
the result for further distribution functions. Using a transformation of the
type G(nV ) = F (nαV ), the result can be extended to α 6= 1. The intuition
for this result is as follows: The initial decrease is driven by the same effect
which drives the transgression probability to zero in the case without sharing,
α = 0. As the group grows larger, more agents have to agree and thus the
probability that someone will object is high. As n becomes even larger, this
effect is overruled by the mechanisms of shared guilt. In a very large group,
guilt can be shared so easily that its effect becomes negligible.
4 Institutions and Immoral Outcomes
In this section we compare various institutions: In Section 4.1 we analyze the
influence of the number of required supporters for a transgression, k, within a
population of fixed size. Section 4.2 focuses on effects of populations size n on
immoral behavior and moral transgression.
Throughout Section 4, we assume a proportional sharing of guilt, s(y) = y.
As seen in the previous section, in this case sharing of guilt can be expected
to play a significant role for most natural distribution functions F .
As outlined in the introduction, we suggest to interpret these comparative
statics results as an analysis of how the decision process within an institution
affects moral outcomes.
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4.1 Number of Required Supporters
In this subsection, we study how the number of supporters necessary for trans-
gression to happen, k, affects moral outcomes. We find that individual thresh-
olds θk,n increase in k. This is intuitive as sharing guilt becomes easier the
more supporters are needed. In contrast, the aggregate transgression proba-
bility Pk,n is decreasing in k for small k but increasing in k for large k: With
very small k just the worst people in the population have to participate for
the transgression to happen. Yet as k increases, people with substantial moral
concerns are needed as supporters. But these people have an incentive to free-
ride on others. This makes transgression less likely overall. In contrast, for
large k effects of shared guilt dominate. In consequence, the smallest values of
Pk,n typically occur for intermediate values of k.
We start by rewriting the equilibrium condition (3) into a slightly more tractable
form for further analysis.
Lemma 2. For s(y) = y, (3) is equivalent to
kV
θk,n
b(n, k, F (θk,n)) =
n∑
j=k
b(n, j, F (θk,n)). (5)
We see that there is a simple relation between the equilibrium probability of
a transgression, the right hand side of (5), and the equilibrium probability
of a transgression which is supported by the minimal number of k agents,
b(n, k, F (θk,n)), on the left hand side.
We now turn to the impact of k for fixed n. Figures 1 and 2 display the be-
havior of θk,n and Pk,n for F being the exponential distribution and V = 1.
As expected, the individual transgression thresholds θk,n are increasing in k:
If k is small, agents can free-ride, hoping that others with less scruples are
around. For large k, the moral costs of supporting the transgression are small
due to sharing of guilt. Accordingly, most types support the transgression. In
particular, θk,n is smaller than V for small k and larger than V for large k: For
small k, agents who would support transgression if they were alone opt against
it in order to free-ride. For large k, agents who would not behave immorally in
an individual decision now decide to support it. This monotonicity behavior
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Figure 1: θk,n as function of k for n = 25, V = 1 and the exponential distri-
bution F (x) = 1− exp(−x).
of θk,n can easily be verified for general distribution functions:
10
Proposition 5. The sequence θk,n is strictly increasing in k.
We next consider the influence of k on the probability that the action is taken.
In the example of Figure 2, we observe that the transgression probabilities Pk,n
form a U -shape. The transgression probability is minimal at some interme-
diate value of k and larger if very few or very many agents have to support
the transgression. The intuition for this U -shape is as follows. For small k,
there will always be a small group of agents who really do not care about
the moral dimension of the problem. For large k, it is certain that the action
will not be taken unless guilt can be shared among many – resulting in small
guilt associated with opting for “Yes”. For intermediate values of k neither of
these two mechanisms helps agents as much to overcome their moral concerns
and, accordingly, immoral action is taken with smaller probability. Thus, our
model predicts that due to a “herd behavior”-like effect, a simple majority vote
k = n/2 is more likely to preserve moral standards than a vote made under
10A similar but slightly more involved proof generalizes this result to all weakly increasing
sharing rules s.
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Figure 2: Pk,25 as function of k for n = 25, V = 1 and the exponential
distribution F (x) = 1− exp(−x).
unanimity, k = n.
The following proposition confirms that the basic logic behind this reasoning
– a decrease at the left end and an increase at the right end – carries over to
a large, non-parametric class of distributions, distributions with a decreasing
density and a finite support.
Proposition 6.
(i) If the density function f of F is bounded and weakly decreasing over an
interval [0, ε], ε > 0, then P1,n > P2,n for sufficiently large n.
(ii) If the support of F is finite, we have Pn−1,n < Pn,n for sufficiently large n.
While an inspection of the proof of Proposition 6 (i) suggests that such a
generalization may be hard to prove, we conjecture that the probabilities Pk,n
are fully U -shaped for decreasing densities which are not too heavy-tailed.11
11Backed by numerical investigations, we further conjecture the following: If f has a single
peak, there still tend to be two maxima in the sequence (Pk,n)k, one at k = n and another
for some small k ≥ 1. If f has multiple peaks, the behavior of Pk,n can be more complex.
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4.2 Population Size
In this section, we study the influence of population size on moral transgres-
sion. We find that while individual transgression thresholds converge to 0 in
n, the expected number of supporters becomes arbitrarily large as n increases.
This is a strong overshooting effect: In the limit, instead of the required k, in-
finitely many people support moral transgression. This holds even if just one
single supporter is required. Instead of one, infinitely many people become
supporters. We furthermore study the behavior of the aggregate transgression
as the population grows large. In the limit, transgression will happen indepen-
dently of the number of supporters required. Yet this transgression probability
is typically not monotone in n. This is due to the interplay between competing
effects of free-riding and sharing guilt.
We start with the behavior of the individual transgression threshold θk,n:
Proposition 7.
(i) limn→∞ θk,n = 0.
(ii) limn→∞ nF (θk,n) =∞.
The first part of the proposition shows that, not surprisingly, the individual
willingness to participate vanishes as n grows large. The second part of the
proposition provides an upper bound on the rate of this decrease. Moreover, it
shows that the expected number of agents who support the decision, nF (θk,n),
gets arbitrarily large for large n – even though the necessary number of sup-
porters k remains fixed.
Finally, we show that Pk,n converges to 1 as n gets large. With many agents,
a sufficiently large group of supporters with sufficiently small moral concerns
will most likely take immoral action.
Proposition 8. limn→∞ Pk,n = 1.
This result complements our findings on the (similar) limit behavior of Pn,n
in Section 3. Interestingly, the convergence in Proposition 8 is typically not
monotonic for k < n. To see this, note that for sufficiently large k and F with
finite support, Pk,k = 1, Pk,n < 1 for n > k and limn→∞ Pk,n = 1. Figure 3
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Figure 3: P15,n as function of n for V = 1 and the exponential distribution
F (x) = 1− exp(−x).
displays the effect for F being the exponential distribution. If we think of Pk,n
as U -shaped in k for fixed n, the effect stems from the fact that for k = n
we are at the right end of such a U -shape, for n ≈ 2k we are somewhere in
the middle of the U -shape for that n. For large n, we are at the left end of a
U -shape.
5 Direct Costs of Pivotality and Outcome-
Independent Guilt
In this section we discuss two natural variations of our basic model: In Section
5.1 we consider a model in which people face additional moral costs if they
were pivotal, i.e., if the transgression would not have happened if they had
chosen “No” instead of “Yes”. We find that most of our results carry over to
this setting. The model with costs of pivotality is strategically equivalent to
a model in which the benefit V from the transgression is heterogeneous across
the population and decreasing in guilt. Our discussion thus covers this model
as well.
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In Section 5.2 we introduce a model in which the costs associated with shared
guilt are paid regardless of whether the transgression occurs or not. In this
model, we observe the following transition in equilibrium behavior depending
on the transgression benefits V : For small V , the unique symmetric equi-
librium is the equilibrium where all agents choose “No”. If V lies above
some threshold there exist several symmetric equilibria in non-trivial thresh-
old strategies, i.e., equilibria where the transgression probability Pk,n is strictly
positive. Among these, the equilibrium with the highest transgression proba-
bility Pareto-dominates all other symmetric equilibria. Thus, in this model a
critical mass of sufficiently willing agents is needed to make the transgression
materialize.
5.1 Costs of Pivotality
We consider a model in which people experience particularly large levels of
guilt if they could have stopped the transgression through their individual
decision. We thus assume that there are additional, direct costs of pivotality
for agents who chose “Yes” whenever exactly k agents opted “Yes” in total.
For simplicity, we focus on a proportional sharing of guilt, s(y) = y. Let the
pivotality cost function c be a non-negative, continuous, strictly increasing
function with c(0) < V . The last condition ensures that at least some agents
might selfishly benefit from the transgression. The realized utility of agent i
with type xi from opting for “Yes” is given by
V 1{Y−i≥k−1} − c(xi) 1{Y−i=k−1} −
xi
1 + Y−i
1{Y−i≥k−1} (6)
where Y−i denotes the number of agents other than i who chose “Yes”. Realized
utility from choosing “No” is still given by
V 1{Y−i≥k}.
Guilt from pivotality is represented by the second term in (6), while the third
term represents (diffused) guilt from supporting the transgression. We assume
that these two facets of guilt are a function of an agent’s type xi and thus
perfectly correlated.
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Before we discuss this generalized model, let us briefly address the case in which
guilt is present only in the form of direct costs of pivotality, i.e., the case in
which the third term in (6) is absent. Then it is easy to see that there exists
a symmetric equilibrium in threshold strategies where agent i votes “Yes”,
whenever V > c(xi). Equilibrium decisions are thus independent of k and n.
In particular, agents stick to the decision they would have made when deciding
alone. The reason is, of course, that in this model the cases where an agent is
pivotal are the only cases where his decision matters.
In the full model with both costs of shared guilt and costs of pivotality, the
counter-part of Proposition 1 is the following result:
Proposition 9. There exists a unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in
which transgression happens with positive probability. In this equilibrium, agent
i votes “Yes” if xi ≤ θk,n and “No” if xi > θk,n. θk,n is the unique solution of
k(V − c(θk,n))
θk,n
b(n, k, F (θk,n)) =
n∑
j=k
b(n, j, F (θk,n)). (7)
Comparing (7) with the corresponding equation (5) in the basic model, it
is easy to see the following strategic equivalence: (7) is also the equilibrium
condition in a modified basic model where agents have heterogeneous benefits
V˜i = V − c(xi) from the transgression. In that model, agents with higher
costs of shared guilt also benefit less from the transgression. In particular,
agents with strong moral concerns may feel bad about realized transgression
even if they said “No” themselves. To sum up, this model with benefits V˜i
is strategically equivalent to the model with pivotality costs (even though the
models are not payoff-equivalent).
By “sandwiching” the present model between two versions of the basic model,
one with benefit V and one with benefit v < V − c(0), one can easily see that
the effect of increasing population size is similar to what we have found in
Section 4.2:
Proposition 10. For k ≥ 1 and n→∞, we have
(i) θk,n → 0.
(ii) nF (θk,n)→∞.
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(iii) Pk,n → 1.
Whether there is a substantial qualitative difference between the present model
and the basic model depends on the following distinction between two cases.
In the case where V −c(x) is positive for all x in the support of F , one can show
that the extended model behaves very similar to the basic one. In terms of the
model with heterogeneous benefits, this is the case where all agents – disregard-
ing no matter how large their guilt/type xi – have a true, i.e. positive, benefit
V˜i from the transgression. If there exists some x
∗ such that V − c(x∗) = 0,
equilibrium thresholds θk,n are bounded by x
∗:
Corollary 2. If there exists x∗ with V − c(x∗) = 0 and F (x∗) < 0, then
θk,n ≤ x∗ for all k and n.
This follows immediately from the fact that the right hand side of (7) is non-
negative. In this case, there is a positive mass of “incorruptible” agents – those
with xi > x
∗ – who never vote in favor of the transgression. In consequence,
we no longer have limn→∞ Pn,n = 1, unanimity does not lead to a transgression
in the large-population limit.
5.2 Outcome-independent Guilt
In the basic model, we assume that agents feel guilt only when the transgres-
sion they supported occurs. In this section, we take a look at rule-based moral
approaches: Agents feel guilt from voting “Yes” regardless of the outcome of
the voting. We assume that they still share guilt with all others who voted like
them. We find the following dichotomy: For small values of the benefit V the
equilibrium in which all agents opt against the transgression is the unique sym-
metric equilibrium. If V lies above some threshold, there are several symmetric
equilibria in which the transgression occurs with strictly positive probability.
The equilibrium with the highest transgression probability Pareto-dominates
all others.12
We thus assume that the realized utility of agent i from opting for “Yes” is
12We leave a complete analysis of this model and, more importantly, intermediate cases
between this and the basic model open for future research.
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given by
V 1{Y−i≥k−1} −
xi
s(1 + Y−i)
while realized utility from voting “No” is given by
V 1{Y−i≥k}.
The following proposition shows that – under mild conditions – transgression
occurs in equilibrium only if V is sufficiently large.
Proposition 11.
(i) Symmetric equilibria in which the transgression occurs with positive probabil-
ity are equilibria in symmetric threshold strategies where equilibrium thresholds
solve
V b(n− 1, k − 1, F (θ)) =
n−1∑
j=0
θ
s(1 + j)
b(n− 1, j, F (θ)).
For sufficiently large V such an equilibrium exists.
(ii) Let f(0) < ∞ and k > 2. Then, for sufficiently large V , there are at least
two distinct symmetric equilibria where the transgression occurs with positive
probability.
(iii) Let f(0) < ∞ and k > 1. Then, for small V , the unique symmetric equi-
librium is the one where all agents vote “No”.
Thus, in equilibrium small temptations V do not lead to a moral transgression
– but sufficiently large ones do. This is due to the fact that the present model
contains a “two-sided” coordination problem: In addition to the possibility of
free-riding on other agents’ “Yes”-votes, there is the risk – when voting “Yes”
– of paying the costs of guilt without reaping the benefit V . The two-sided
coordination problem also causes the multiplicity of equilibria in case (ii)
6 No Sharing Of Guilt
In this section, we discuss how our basic model with proportional sharing of
guilt, s(y) = y, differs from the more standard model without any sharing of
guilt, s(y) ≡ 1. If the number of supporters necessary, k, is fixed, the model
without shared guilt is equivalent to a model with shared guilt in which the
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gain out of transgression is adjusted from V to V/(k−1). This illustrates that
sharing guilt makes transgression much more likely, causing the participation
of people who would never like to become responsible for the immoral action
to happen individually.
Furthermore, the models’ behavior in k differs drastically. While we observed a
U -shape in the aggregate transgression probabilities under shared guilt, these
probabilities tend to decrease in k if diffusion of guilt is ruled out. In the case
of unanimity, i.e. k = n, the aggregate transgression probability decreases very
quickly to 0 if guilt is not divisible.
For a more detailed comparison of the models with and without shared guilt,
let us denote by ρk,n and Qk,n the thresholds and transgression probabilities
for the model without sharing, s(y) ≡ 1. The corresponding quantities under
s(y) = y we continue to denote by θk,n and Pk,n. Sometimes, we need to em-
phasize the dependence on V and write ρk,n(V ) etc. We begin by inspecting
the case in which only one supporter is needed for moral transgression to hap-
pen, i.e. k = 1, for the model without sharing.
Proposition 12. ρ1,n monotonically converges to 0 in n. Moreover, Q1,n → 1
as n→∞.
We have seen in Corollary 1 (i) that Qn,n → 0. In contrast, Pn,n → 1 for most
distribution functions F . Accordingly, instead of the U -shape of the sequence
(Pk,n)k, we find that without shared guilt, the transgression probability Qk,n
tends to decrease as more agents become necessary for transgression to take
place.
If k > 1, there is a surprising strategic equivalence13 between the models with
and without shared guilt:
Proposition 13. For k > 1 and n > 1, we have
ρk,n(V ) = θk−1,n−1
(
V
k − 1
)
.
13This is not a strategic equivalence in the strictest sense, since the number of players
between the games differs.
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Thus, up to small adjustments of k and n, thresholds are identical in a model
without sharing and a model with sharing if the individual gain out of trans-
gression is divided by k− 1. Hence, differences in the gains from transgression
must be considerable to lead to comparable transgression probabilities in the
models with and without sharing.
Applying Proposition 13, the results of Section 4.2 can easily be transferred to
the model without sharing. As n gets large while k remains fixed, thresholds
vanish, the expected number of supporters gets large, and the transgression
probability converges to 1. Note that while limit behavior becomes similar,
quantitative result should be very different for fixed k and n as illustrated by
the drastic adaption of the individual gain out of transgression which is nec-
essary to make the models comparable.
Proposition 14. For k > 1 and n→∞, we have
(i) ρk,n → 0.
(ii) nF (ρk,n)→∞.
(iii) Qk,n → 1.
To sum up, in the free-riding regime of small, fixed k in a population that grows
large, differences between the models are quantitative rather than qualitative
– and they are substantial. For large k in a population of limited size, in
addition to marked quantitative differences, there are qualitative differences
as well.
7 Conclusion
We have studied the role of institutions in affecting individual moral behavior
and moral outcomes within smaller and larger populations. In particular, we
have analyzed the effects of shared guilt when institutions require the sup-
port of several people for moral transgression to happen. Our study follows
a standard game-theoretic approach, but incorporates evidence from social
psychology that people acting together with others tend to feel less individual
guilt, less responsibility, and have lower impressions of breaking social norms.14
14See Fischer (2011). For an overview of related work in economics, see Bowles (1998).
25
When people share guilt, large groups might be willing to support a transgres-
sion – if institutions require such collaboration. Thus, barriers of individual
moral concerns may be substantially lowered by institutional design – unless
there is a substantial fraction of people with extremely high moral standards.
Looking through human history, it becomes plausible that institutions asking
for the collaboration of many people facilitate moral transgression, especially
if individual moral standards are low anyway. Some historians even point out
that most drastic atrocity was facilitated by such institutional design.15
It is hence important to understand institutional influences on moral behavior
– ultimately, of course, to prevent moral transgression from taking place.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We first show that all equilibria, symmetric or not, in
which the action is taken with positive probability must be equilibria in thresh-
old strategies: For each agent there is a threshold θk,n,i ∈ [0,∞] such that i
votes “Yes” if xi < θk,n,i and “No”, if xi > θk,n,i. To see this, fix the strategies
of i’s opponents. In an equilibrium where the action is taken with positive
probability, at least k− 1 of the opponents vote “Yes” with positive probabil-
ity. Assume agent i weakly prefers voting “Yes” over “No” at some value xi.
Comparing the expectations of (1) and (2) over the opponents’ strategies im-
plies that this preference must be strict for types with smaller costs. Likewise,
if agent i weakly prefers voting “No” over “Yes” at some value of xi, this pref-
erence must be strict at all types with higher costs. Thus, all best-responses
to the opponents’ strategies are threshold strategies. Therefore, all equilibria
where the action is taken with positive probability are equilibria in threshold
strategies.16
Thus, for k < n it remains to show that there exists a unique threshold θk,n > 0
with the property that if all agents play a threshold strategy with θk,n, an agent
with type θk,n is indifferent between voting “Yes” and “No”. We treat the case
15Compare Browning’s (2004) view on what made the Holocaust possible. For a discussion
and conflicting views, compare Goldhagen, Browning and Wieseltier (1996).
16Since the equilibrium where all agents always vote “No” is also in threshold strategies,
it follows that in fact all symmetric equilibria are in threshold strategies.
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k = n separately at the end. Consider an agent with type x and assume
his opponents play a threshold strategy with θk,n > 0. Expected payoff from
voting “Yes” is then given by
n−1∑
j=k−1
b(n− 1, j, F (θk,n))
(
V − x
s(1 + j)
)
(8)
where the Binomial distribution arises since opponents vote “Yes” indepen-
dently with probability F (θk,n). Expected payoff from voting “No” is given
by
n−1∑
j=k
b(n− 1, j, F (θk,n))V. (9)
Equilibria are characterized by values of θk,n for which the two expressions
coincide for x = θk,n. Equating (8) and (9) for x = θk,n yields the condition
b(n− 1, k − 1, F (θk,n))V = θk,n
n−1∑
j=k−1
b(n− 1, j, F (θk,n)) 1
s(1 + j)
. (10)
which is (3). It remains to show existence of a unique solution. To this end,
we write (10) as
V
θk,n
=
∑n−1
j=k−1 b(n− 1, j, F (θk,n)) 1s(1+j)
b(n− 1, k − 1, F (θk,n)) . (11)
The left hand side of (11) is strictly decreasing in θk,n, diverging to ∞ at 0.
Writing the right hand side as
n−1∑
j=k−1
1
s(1 + j)
(
n−1
j
)(
n−1
k−1
) ( F (θk,n)
1− F (θk,n)
)j−k+1
we see that it increases strictly from s(k)−1 to ∞ as θk,n moves through the
support of F . This shows the existence of a unique solution θk,n in the interior
of the support. It remains to consider k = n. As in the case k < n, an interior
separating equilibrium must be characterized by (11) which becomes
V
θn,n
=
1
s(n)
. (12)
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In the case where (12) does not possess an interior solution (and only then),
all agents voting “Yes” regardless of their type is an equilibrium: This holds
whenever V ≥ x
s(n)
for all x in the support of F .
Proof of Proposition 2. We have to solve the condition Pn,n = F (n
αV )n =
q for F . Taking logarithms yields n log(F (nαV )) = log(q). The monotone
transformation x = nαV , i.e., n = x1/αV −1/α yields
log(F (x)) = x−
1
αV
1
α log(q) = −x− 1αβ.
Taking the exponential of both sides of the equation gives the desired ex-
pression for F . Since the resulting F is a Fre´chet-distribution, we know in
particular that it is indeed a distribution function on R+.
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove (i) and (ii) in two steps: We first show that
x
1+α
α f(x) → 0 and x 1+αα f(x) → ∞ imply, respectively, n(1 − F (nαV )) → 0
and n(1 − F (nαV )) → ∞. We then derive Pn,n → 1 and Pn,n → 0 from
these conditions (which can in fact be shown to be equivalent). Fix ε > 0 and
assume x
1+α
α f(x)→ 0. Then for sufficiently large n we have x 1+αα f(x) ≤ ε for
all x ≥ nαV . It follows that
n(1− F (nαV )) = n
∫ ∞
nαV
f(x)dx ≤ εn
∫ ∞
nαV
x−
1+α
α dx = εαV −
1
α .
Since ε was arbitrary, this proves n(1− F (nαV ))→ 0. Fix κ > 0 and assume
x
1+α
α f(x) → ∞. Then for sufficiently large n, we have x 1+αα f(x) ≥ κ for all
x ≥ nαV . Arguing similarly to before, we have n(1 − F (nαV )) ≥ καV − 1α .
n(1 − F (nαV )) → ∞ and the first step of the proof is complete. For the
second step, write
F (nαV )n =
(
1 +
n(F (nαV )− 1)
n
)n
(13)
Assume n(1 − F (nαV )) → 0 and fix ε > 0. Then for sufficiently large n we
have n(F (nαV )− 1) ≥ −ε. Thus by (13)
F (nαV )n ≥
(
1− ε
n
)n
→ exp(−ε)
Since we also have F (nαV )n ≤ 1 this implies F (nαV )n → 1. Now, assume
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n(1 − F (nαV )) → ∞ and fix κ > 0. For sufficiently large n, we have
n(F (nαV )− 1) ≤ −κ. This yields
F (nαV )n ≤
(
1− κ
n
)n
→ exp(−κ).
Since we can choose κ arbitrarily large and since we also have F (nαV )n ≥ 0,
it follows that F (nαV )n → 0 and the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 4. We first prove a criterion on F which ensures that
the result holds. Then we prove that exponential distributions and power
distributions satisfy this criterion. The criterion runs as follows: Let F :
[0,∞) → [0,∞) be twice continuously differentiable with f(x) > 0 for x ≥ 0
and F (xV )x → 1 for x→∞. Furthermore, let there be exactly one x0 ∈ (0,∞)
such that
2 = x0V
(
F ′(x0V )
F (x0V )
− F
′′(x0V )
F ′(x0V )
)
(14)
Then F (xV )x has exactly one minimum on (0,∞). In particular, for suffi-
ciently small V and α = 1, the sequence Pn,n decreases up to some n0 > 1 and
increases from n0 + 1 on. We first prove the criterion. We begin by showing
that
lim
x→0
F (xV )x = 1
As F (x) is differentiable in 0 with F ′(0) > 0, there exists a γ > 0 such that
for all x small enough, F (xV ) ≥ xγ. Thus, for all x small enough,
1 ≥ F (xV )x ≥ (γx)x.
For x→ 0, x > 0 the right hand side tends to 1 as xx → 1.
Now let us turn to the central part of the proof:
(F (xV )x)′ = (ex logF (xV ))′ = ex logF (xV )
(
logF (xV ) + x
V F ′(xV )
F (xV )
)
(15)
We show that there exists exactly one x0 ∈ (0,∞) such that this term vanishes.
Note that the whole term vanishes exactly when logF (xV )+xV F
′(xV )
F (xV )
vanishes.
We first show that the derivative of logF (xV ) + xV F
′(xV )
F (xV )
is 0 exactly once in
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(0,∞): (
logF (xV ) + x
V F ′(xV )
F (xV )
)′
=
V F ′(xV )
F (xV )
+
V F ′(xV )
F (xV )
+ x
V 2F ′′(xV )
F (xV )
− xV
2F ′(xV )2
F (xV )2
which is 0 exactly when
2 = xV
(
F ′(xV )
F (xV )
− F
′′(xV )
F ′(xV )
)
We have assumed that this term is 0 exactly once.
The mean value theorem tells us now that the term g(x) := logF (xV ) +
xV F
′(xV )
F (xV )
vanishes at most two times. We will now show that g(x) vanishes
exactly once.
As F (xV )x → 1 for x→ 0 and F (xV )x → 1 for x→∞ and by equation (15),
g(x) is < 0 for small x and > 0 for large x. Let us assume that g(x) has two
different roots x0 < x1. As we have shown above these are the only roots of
this function. Thus, g(t) < 0 for t < x0 and g(t) > 0 for t > x1. As we assume
that the derivative of g has exactly one root the mean value theorem tells us
that this has to happen for a t0 ∈ (x0, x1). If g(t0) = 0, we have a contradiction
as the derivative of g vanishes at least two times (mean value theorem). This
implies g(t0) 6= 0. Assume without loss of generality that g(t0) > 0. We have
t0 < x1, g(t0) > g(x1) and g(t) > g(x1) for t > x1, therefore the function g
attains a local minimum in (t0, x1]. Therefore, the derivative of g vanishes at
least two times. Contradiction.
Therefore we proved that there exists at most one x0 ∈ (0,∞) such that
g(x0) = 0. As g(x) is continuous, negative near 0 and positive for high x,
there exists exactly one x0 with this property. Therefore, F (xV )
x has exactly
on minimum in [0,∞). This shows, that our criterion is valid.
We now turn to the exponential distribution F (x) = 1− e−cx for a c > 0. By
Proposition 3, F (nV )n → 1 for n→∞, n ∈ N. We have
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1 ≥ F (xV )x ≥ (F ([x]V )[x])x/[x] (16)
and hence also F (xV )x → 1 for x→∞, x ∈ R.
Hence we only have to show that the equation (14) has exactly one solution:
2 = xV
(
ce−cxV
1− e−cxV + c
)
= xcV
(
1
1− e−cxV
)
(17)
Without loss of generality let us assume c = V = 1. As the derivative of e−x
at 0 is −1, for x→ 0 the right hand side of the equation converges to 1:
lim
x→0
e−x − 1
x
= −1
As the right hand side diverges to ∞ for x → ∞ it suffices to show that the
right hand side is increasing in x: We have(
x
1− e−x
)′
=
(1− e−x)− xe−x
(1− e−x)2
and, as ex > 1 + x for x > 0, 1 − e−x − xe−x > 0. This proves the result for
the exponential distribution.
We next turn to F (x) = 1 − ( b
x+b
)γ for b > 0, γ > 1. By Proposition 3 and
(16), F (xV )x → 1 for x→∞. Hence we only have to show that equation (14)
has exactly one solution:
2 = V x
(
γ b
γ
(V x+b)γ+1
1− bγ
(V x+b)γ
+
(γ + 1)
V x+ b
)
=
V x
V x+ b
(
γ
bγ
(V x+b)γ
1− bγ
(V x+b)γ
+ (γ + 1)
)
(18)
Without loss of generality, let us assume V = 1. The right hand side of
the equation converges to γ + 1 > 2 as x → ∞. For x → 0 one can prove
analogously to equation (17) that the right hand side converges to 1; note that
the derivative of 1− bγ
(x+b)γ
is γ b
γ
(x+b)γ+1
. We show now that the right hand side
is strictly increasing in x:
r.h.s. =
x
x+ b
γ
(
1
1− bγ
(x+b)γ
+
1
γ
)
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It obviously suffices to show that
x+ b
x
(
1− b
γ
(x+ b)γ
)
is weakly decreasing in x.
x+ b
x
(
1− b
γ
(x+ b)γ
)
=
x+ b
x
(
1− b
x+ b
+
b
x+ b
− b
γ
(x+ b)γ
)
= 1 +
x+ b
x
(
b
x+ b
− b
γ
(x+ b)γ
)
= 1 +
b
x
(
1− b
γ−1
(x+ b)γ−1
)
(19)
Now note that γ > 1 implies that x 7→ 1 − bγ−1
(x+b)γ−1 is a concave function on
[0,∞). We now use the following fact: Let g be a concave function on R,
x > x0. Then
g(x)− g(x0)
x− x0
is weakly decreasing in x. This fact for x0 = 0 shows that (19) is weakly
decreasing in x. We have shown that the right hand side of (18) converges to
1 for x → 0, is strictly increasing and converges to a γ + 1 > 2 for x → ∞.
Therefore this equation has exactly one solution in (0,∞).
Proof of Lemma 2. Since we have θk,n > 0 and s(y) = y, we can rewrite the
sum on the right hand side of (10) as follows:
n−1∑
j=k−1
b(n− 1, j, F (θk,n)) 1
1 + j
=
n−1∑
j=k−1
(
n− 1
j
)
F (θk,n)
j(1− F (θk,n))n−j−1 1
1 + j
=
1
n
n−1∑
j=k−1
(
n
j + 1
)
F (θk,n)
j(1− F (θk,n))n−j−1
=
1
n
n∑
l=k
(
n
l
)
F (θk,n)
l−1(1− F (θk,n))n−l
=
1
nF (θk,n)
n∑
l=k
b(n, l, F (θk,n))
Inserting b(n− 1, k− 1, F (θk,n)) = knF (θk,n)b(n, k, F (θk,n)) on the left hand side
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of (10) and multiplying by nF (θk,n) we obtain
k b(n, k, F (θk,n))V = θk,n
n∑
j=k
b(n, j, F (θk,n)) (20)
which is (5).
Proof of Proposition 5. The equilibrium condition (5) can be written as
kV
θk,n
=
∑n
j=k b(n, j, F (θk,n))
b(n, k, F (θk,n))
. (21)
To see the result, we insert θk+1,n into the left hand and right hand sides of
(21) for k:
kV
θk+1,n
<
(k + 1)V
θk+1,n
=
∑n
j=k+1 b(n, j, F (θk+1,n))
b(n, k + 1, F (θk+1,n))
≤
∑n
j=k b(n, j, F (θk+1,n))
b(n, k, F (θk+1,n))
. (22)
The final inequality relies on the fact that the expression at hand is the recip-
rocal of the failure rate of the Binomial distribution which is increasing in k,
see Johnson, Kotz and Kemp (1992), Chapter 3. The left hand side and right
hand side of (11) cross only once in θ for fixed k with the left hand side being
larger to the left of the intersection. We thus conclude from (22) that θk+1,n
lies to the right of the intersection, θk+1,n > θk,n.
Proof of Proposition 6. 17 Part (ii) of the proposition follows from the obser-
vations that Pn−1,n ∈ (0, 1) while Pn,n = 1 for sufficiently large n if the support
of F is finite. It remains to prove (i). By the definitions of θ1,n and θ2,n, we
know that
P1,n = V n
F (θ1,n)
θ1,n
(1− F (θ1,n))n−1 = 1− (1− F (θ1,n))n
17While we present the results in an order guided by economic considerations, the logical
contingencies are slightly different: The proof of Proposition 6 depends on the results of
Section 4.2 in addition to the results stated earlier.
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and
P2,n = 1− (1− F (θ2,n))n − nF (θ2,n)(1− F (θ2,n))n−1
= V n(n− 1)F (θ2,n)
2
θ2,n
(1− F (θ2,n))n−2. (23)
Let an = (1 − F (θ1,n))n−1 and bn = (1 − F (θ2,n))n−2. Then, by inserting this
into the equations above:
an =
1
V nF (θ1,n)
θ1,n
+ (1− F (θ1,n))
and
bn =
1
V n(n− 1)F (θ2,n)2
θ2,n
+ (1− F (θ2,n))2 + nF (θ2,n)(1− F (θ2,n))
.
It follows that
P2,n = V n(n− 1)F (θ2,n)
2
θ2,n
(1− F (θ2,n))n−2 = V n(n− 1)F (θ2,n)
2
θ2,n
bn
=
1
1 + (1−F (θ2,n))
2θ2,n
V n(n−1)F (θ2,n)2 +
(1−F (θ2,n))θ2,n
V (n−1)F (θ2,n)
and
P1,n = V n
F (θ1,n)
θ1,n
an =
1
1 + θ1,n
F (θ1,n)
1−F (θ1,n)
V n
.
Therefore, P1,n > P2,n iff
θ1,n
F (θ1,n)
1− F (θ1,n)
V n
<
(1− F (θ2,n))2θ2,n
V n(n− 1)F (θ2,n)2 +
(1− F (θ2,n))θ2,n
V (n− 1)F (θ2,n)
i.e., iff
θ1,n
F (θ1,n)
(1− F (θ1,n)) < θ2,n
F (θ2,n)
(
(1− F (θ2,n))2
(n− 1)F (θ2,n) +
n(1− F (θ2,n))
(n− 1)
)
.
Note that for any concave function F and x < y < z,
F (z)− F (x)
z − x ≤
F (y)− F (x)
y − x
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By our assumptions and by Propositions 5 and 7, we know that θ2,n → 0,
F (0) = 0, θ1,n < θ2,n and that F is indeed concave (weakly decreasing density)
near 0. Hence, for sufficiently large n we have
F (θ2,n)
θ2,n
=
F (θ2,n)− F (0)
θ2,n − 0 ≤
F (θ1,n)− F (0)
θ1,n − 0 =
F (θ1,n)
θ1,n
.
Thus, it suffices to show that for large n:
1− F (θ1,n) < (1− F (θ2,n))
2
(n− 1)F (θ2,n) +
n(1− F (θ2,n))
(n− 1) . (24)
As preliminary observations, note that P1,n = V n
F (θ1,n)
θ1,n
(1 − F (θ1,n))n−1 → 1
by Proposition 8, and that
F (θ1,n)
θ1,n
=
F (θ1,n)− F (0)
θ1,n − 0 → f(0) > 0 (25)
for n→∞ as θ1,n → 0. Thus, both F (θ1,n)θ1,n and n(1− F (θ1,n))n−1 are bounded
from above and from below by strictly positive numbers.
In inequality (24), we now take both sides to the power of n− 1 and multiply
them by n. We have just seen that the left hand term is bounded. Thus, if we
show that
n
(
(1− F (θ2,n))2
(n− 1)F (θ2,n) +
n(1− F (θ2,n))
(n− 1)
)n−1
→∞
the proof is complete. We have the lower bound
n
(
(1− F (θ2,n))2
(n− 1)F (θ2,n) +
n(1− F (θ2,n))
(n− 1)
)n−1
(26)
= n(1− F (θ2,n))n−1
(
1 +
1
F (θ2,n)(n− 1)
)n−1
≥ n
F (θ2,n)
(1− F (θ2,n))n−1.
In the last inequality we have used that by binomial expansion,(
1 +
1
F (θ2,n)(n− 1)
)n−1
> (n− 1) 1
(n− 1)F (θ2,n) =
1
F (θ2,n)
.
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As P2,n → 1 and θ2,n → 0, we deduce from (23) that
(1− F (θ2,n))n−1 ∼ (1− F (θ2,n))n−2 ∼ θ2,n
V n(n− 1)F (θ2,n)2 . (27)
Arguing as in (25), we see that θ2,n
F (θ2,n)
is bounded from below by a strictly
positive number. Combining (26) and (27), it thus remains to show that
(n− 1)F (θ2,n)2 → 0.
To this end, let nj be a subsequence such that (nj − 1)F (θ2,nj)2 ≥ κ > 0 for a
κ > 0. Then, as F (θ2,n)
θ2,n
≤ C for a C > 0 and F (θ2,nj) ≤ 1,
P2,nj = V nj(nj − 1)
F (θ2,nj)
2
θ2,nj
(1− F (θ2,nj))nj−2
≤ CV nj(nj − 1)
(
1−
√
κ√
nj − 1
)nj−2
.
As κ > 0, this term converges to 0, which is a contradiction to P2,nj → 1. To
see this convergence to 0, write
(
1−
√
κ√
nj − 1
)nj−2
=
(1− √κ√
nj − 1
)√nj−1
nj−2√
nj−1
.
The inner term converges to exp(−√κ) < 1. Therefore, (n − 1)F (θ2,n)2 →
0.
Proof of Proposition 7. We first prove (i). Suppose (i) is violated, i.e., suppose
there exists a subsequence nj of N and ε > 0 such that θk,nj ≥ ε > 0 for all
j ∈ N. Note that the sum
n∑
i=k
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i
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is monotonically increasing in p for p ∈ [0, 1]. Thus,
nj∑
i=k
(
nj
i
)
F (θk,nj)
i(1− F (θk,nj))nj−i ≥
nj∑
i=k
(
nj
i
)
F (ε)i(1− F (ε))nj−i (28)
= 1−
k−1∑
i=0
(
nj
i
)
F (ε)i(1− F (ε))nj−i.
Since ε > 0 implies F (ε) > 0, the right hand side converges to 1:
(
nj
i
)
grows
polynomially in nj and (1 − F (ε))nj−i decays exponentially in nj. Now we
rewrite the equilibrium condition∑nj
i=k
(
nj
i
)
F (θk,nj)
i(1− F (θk,nj))nj−i(
nj
k
)
F (θk,nj)
k(1− F (θk,nj))nj−k
=
kV
θk,nj
to
nj∑
i=k
(
nj
i
)
F (θk,nj)
i(1− F (θk,nj))nj−i =
kV
θk,nj
(
nj
k
)
F (θk,nj)
k(1− F (θk,nj))nj−k
≤ kV
ε
(
nj
k
)
(1− F (ε)))nj−k. (29)
As F (ε) > 0, and as
(
nj
i
)
grows polynomially in nj and (1− F (ε))nj−i decays
exponentially in nj, the final term converges to 0. This is a contradiction, as
we proved in (28) that the left hand side of (29) converges to 1.
Now we turn to (ii) which we prove by contradiction as well: Let nj be a
subsequence such that njF (θk,nj) is bounded from above by κ > 0. Observe
that
kV
θk,nj
(
nj
k
)
F (θk,nj)
k(1−F (θk,nj))nj−k =
nj∑
i=k
(
nj
i
)
F (θk,nj)
i
(
1− F (θk,nj)
)nj−i ≤ 1
(30)
Thus, we can conclude that the right hand side of the following inequality is
bounded in j:
1
θk,nj
(
nj
k
)
F (θk,nj)
k(1− F (θk,nj))nj−k ≥
(
nj
k
)
1
θk,nj
F (θk,nj)
k
(
1− κ
nj
)nj−k
As (1− κ
nj
)nj−k converges to exp(−κ), it follows from the above inequality that
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(
nj
k
)
1
θk,nj
F (θk,nj)
k is bounded. Since we have
lim
j→∞
(
nj
k
)
1
nkj
= lim
j→∞
1
k!
k−1∏
i=0
nj − i
nj
=
1
k!
, (31)
we know that nkj
1
θk,nj
F (θk,nj)
k is bounded. As θk,nj → 0, it follows that
F (θk,nj)nj → 0. It remains to show that this leads to a contradiction: We
use the following identity (see, e.g., Chapter 1 of Johnson, Kotz and Kemp
(1992)), which holds for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, p ∈ [0, 1]:
k−1∑
i=0
pi(1− p)n−i = n!
(n− k)!(k − 1)!
∫ 1−p
0
un−k(1− u)k−1du.
From this we deduce (for p = 0, both sides are equal to 1) that
n∑
i=k
pi(1− p)n−i = n!
(n− k)!(k − 1)!
∫ 1
1−p
un−k(1− u)k−1du.
On the right hand side we substitute u 7→ 1− u:
n∑
i=k
pi(1− p)n−i = n!
(n− k)!(k − 1)!
∫ p
0
(1− u)n−kuk−1du.
We can plug this into (30) to obtain:
V
1
θk,nj
F (θk,nj)
k(1− F (θk,nj))nj−k =
∫ F (θk,nj )
0
pk−1(1− p)nj−kdp
=
∫ 1
0
F (θk,nj)
kpk−1(1− pF (θk,nj))nj−kdp (32)
where in the last equality we substituted p 7→ F (θk,nj)p. For any p ∈ [0, 1],
1 ≥ (1− pF (θk,nj))nj−k ≥
(
1− F (θk,nj)nj
nj
)nj−k
→ exp(−0) = 1
as F (θk,nj)nj → 0. Thus, (1− pF (θk,nj))nj−k converges uniformly in p ∈ [0, 1]
to e−0 = 1 for j →∞. This implies that
lim
j→∞
∫ 1
0
pk−1(1− pF (θk,nj))nj−kdp =
1
k
(33)
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and
lim
j→∞
(1− F (θk,nj))nj−k = 1. (34)
If we now look at (32), the left hand side is ∼ V 1
θk,nj
F (θk,nj)
k by (34), while
by (33) the last term in the equation ∼ 1
k
F (θk,nj)
k for j → ∞. As θk,nj → 0
for j →∞, this is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 8. Fix k and V . Let κ > 0 be arbitrary. By Proposition
7, nF (θk,n)→∞. Thus, for n sufficiently large, nF (θk,n) ≥ κ. Since
n∑
i=k
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i
is increasing in p for p ∈ [0, 1], we have for sufficiently large n,
Pk,n =
n∑
i=k
(
n
i
)
F (θk,n)
i(1− F (θk,n))n−i ≥
n∑
i=k
(
n
i
)(κ
n
)i (
1− κ
n
)n−i
= 1−
k−1∑
i=0
(
n
i
)(κ
n
)i (
1− κ
n
)n−i
(35)
Arguing as in (31), we also know that for fixed i,
lim
n→∞
(
n
i
)
1
ni
=
1
i!
Thus, for n→∞, (35) converges to
1−
k−1∑
i=0
κi
i!
e−κ
which converges to 1 as κ→∞.
Proof of Proposition 9. The proof is parallel to the one of Proposition 1: It
suffices to note that (V−c(θ))
θ
is decreasing in θ and positive for small θ since
V − c(0) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 10. We first prove limn→∞ θk,n = 0. Denote by θ′k,n the
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(unique) nonegative solution of the equation
kV
θ′k,n
b(n, k, F (θ′k,n)) =
n∑
j=k
b(n, j, F (θ′k,n)),
i.e., of the equilibrium condition of the basic model with benefit V . Let us
assume θk,n > θ
′
k,n. Then we have
k(V − c(θk,n))
θk,n
<
kV
θ′k,n
and as ∑n
j=k b(n, j, F (θ))
b(n, k, F (θ))
=
n∑
j=k
(
n
j
)
/
(
n
k
)(
F (θ)
1− F (θ)
)j−k
is weakly increasing in θ, it follows that∑n
j=k b(n, j, F (θ
′
k,n))
b(n, k, F (θ′k,n))
≤
∑n
j=k b(n, j, F (θk,n))
b(n, k, F (θk,n))
which yields a contradiction to the definition of θk,n. So we have θk,n ≤ θ′k,n.
We know from Proposition 7 (i) that θ′k,n → 0, so it follows that θk,n → 0.
Now let us prove that limn→∞ nF (θk,n) = ∞. Since θk,n → 0, and c(0) < V
there exists an ε > 0 such that V − c(θk,n) > ε for large n. Denote by θ′′k,n the
(unique) nonegative solution of
kε
θ′′k,n
b(n, k, F (θ′′k,n)) =
n∑
j=k
b(n, j, F (θ′′k,n)),
i.e., of the equilibrium condition of the basic model with benefit ε.
We know from Proposition 7 (ii) that nF (θ′′k,n) → ∞. By similar reasoning
as above, θ′′k,n ≤ θk,n for large n, so it follows that nF (θk,n) → ∞. Finally,
analogously to the proof of Proposition 8 we get limn→∞ Pk,n = 1.
Proof of Proposition 11. Let us prove the first assertion. We look for θ > 0
where the expected payoff of voting “No” is equal to the expected payoff of
voting “Yes”, i.e. we look for solutions θ > 0 of the equation
40
V
n−1∑
j=k
b(n−1, j, F (θ)) = V
n−1∑
j=k−1
b(n−1, j, F (θ))−
n−1∑
j=0
θ
s(1 + j)
b(n−1, j, F (θ))
(36)
i.e.
V b(n− 1, k − 1, F (θ)) =
n−1∑
j=0
θ
s(1 + j)
b(n− 1, j, F (θ)). (37)
The right hand side is nonegative, 0 for θ = 0, and diverges to ∞ for θ →∞.
The left hand side is bounded, continuous in θ and positive for θ > 0. This
implies that for large V there exists at least one nontrivial solution θ > 0 to
this equation.
A solution θ of equation (36) is the threshold of a symmetric Bayesian equi-
librium, where all agents vote “Yes”, if xi ≤ θ and “No”, if xi > θ, as the
expected utility of an agent voting “Yes” decreases in the private type xi.
Now let us turn to the second assertion. Analogously as in Proposition 1 all
symmetric Bayesian equilibria are equilibria in threshold strategies. The case
threshold =∞ is trivial. Let us look again at (37). We want to show that this
equation has no solution θ > 0 for small V . For large θ,
V b(n− 1, k − 1, F (θ)) <
n−1∑
j=0
θ
s(1 + j)
b(n− 1, j, F (θ))
Thus, by continuity in θ, it suffices to show that for small θ > 0 and small V ,
V b(n− 1, k − 1, F (θ)) <
n−1∑
j=0
θ
s(1 + j)
b(n− 1, j, F (θ))
First note that
θ
s(1)
(1− F (θ))n−1 <
n−1∑
j=0
θ
s(1 + j)
b(n− 1, j, F (θ)) (38)
with
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V b(n− 1, k − 1, F (θ)) = V
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
F (θ)k−1(1− F (θ)n−k ≤ V
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
F (θ)
(39)
as k > 1. Now choose V sufficiently small such that V
(
n−1
k−1
)
F ′(0) < 1/s(1)
which implies that
V
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
F (θ) <
θ(1− F (θ))n−1
s(1)
for small θ as F (θ)/θ → F ′(0) and F (θ)→ 0 for θ → 0. This proves the claim.
Now let us turn to the third assertion.
Similarly as in (38) and (39), one can show that
V b(n− 1, k − 1, F (θ)) <
n−1∑
j=0
θ
s(1 + j)
b(n− 1, j, F (θ))
for a fixed (arbitrary large) V if θ > 0 is small enough. Hence, by continuity
and positivity of both terms for θ > 0, for large V there are at least two
positive solutions to (37) with at least one solution satisfying F (θ) < 1. Thus,
the two solutions correspond to two distinct threshold strategies.
Note that
n−1∑
j=0
1
s(1 + j)
b(n− 1, j, F (θ)) (40)
is weakly decreasing in θ. By linearity, and as the function s(1 + j) is weakly
increasing, this claim can be reduced to the well-known fact that
m∑
j=0
b(n− 1, j, F (θ))
is weakly decreasing in θ for m ≤ n− 1.
Now let us denote by θ
(1)
k,n < θ
(2)
k,n two solutions of (36) which correspond to
two different threshold strategies, i.e. F (θ
(1)
k,n) < F (θ
(2)
k,n). We show that the
equilibrium associated with the second threshold strategy is strongly Pareto
superior to the first. Note that this argument covers the trivial equilibrium
θ
(1)
k,n = 0.
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Let us consider a player of type x ≤ θ(1)k,n. In both equilibria, he votes “Yes”,
the expected payoffs are
V
n−1∑
j=k−1
b(n− 1, j, F (θ(i)k,n))−
n−1∑
j=0
x
s(1 + j)
b(n− 1, j, F (θ(i)k,n))
for i ∈ {1, 2}.
The expected payoff is larger in the second equilibrium, as the first term is
increasing whereas the second term is weakly decreasing, see (40). The case
θ
(2)
k,n < x can be treated similarly. In the case θ
(2)
k,n < x ≤ θ(2)k,n we have to
compare the expected payoffs
V
n−1∑
j=k
b(n− 1, j, F (θ(1)k,n))
and
V
n−1∑
j=k−1
b(n− 1, j, F (θ(2)k,n))−
n−1∑
j=0
x
s(1 + j)
b(n− 1, j, F (θ(2)k,n))
We use F (θ
(1)
k,n) < F (θ
(2)
k,n), to show
V
n−1∑
j=k−1
b(n− 1, j, F (θ(2)k,n))−
n−1∑
j=0
x
s(1 + j)
b(n− 1, j, F (θ(2)k,n))
≥V
n−1∑
j=k−1
b(n− 1, j, F (θ(2)k,n))−
n−1∑
j=0
θ
(2)
k,n
s(1 + j)
b(n− 1, j, F (θ(2)k,n))
=V
n−1∑
j=k
b(n− 1, j, F (θ(2)k,n))
>V
n−1∑
j=k
b(n− 1, j, F (θ(1)k,n))
which proves the claim.
Proof of Proposition 12. For s(y) ≡ 1 and k = 1 the equilibrium condition (3)
reduces to
ρ1,n = V (1− F (ρ1,n))n−1.
A unique solution ρ1,n exists due to Proposition 1. That ρ1,n decreases in n
follows from the fact that (1−F (ρ))n−1 is decreasing in n and weakly decreasing
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in ρ. To see that ρ1,n → 0, suppose otherwise, i.e., there exists κ > 0 and a
subsequence nj such that ρ1,nj ≥ κ for all j. Then
ρ1,nj = V (1− F (ρ1,nj))nj−1 ≤ V (1− F (κ))nj−1
and the fact that the right hand side converges to 0 in j gives a contradiction.
Moreover, we have
Q1,n = 1− (1− F (ρ1,n))n = 1− (1− F (ρ1,n))ρ1,n
V
→ 1.
Proof of Proposition 13. For s(y) ≡ 1 and k > 1 the equilibrium condition (3)
becomes
V b(n− 1, k − 1, F (ρk,n)) = ρk,n
n−1∑
j=k−1
b(n− 1, j, F (ρk,n)),
Substituting n¯ = n− 1, k¯ = k − 1 and V¯ = V/k¯, this becomes
k¯V¯ b(n¯, k¯, F (ρk,n)) = ρk,n
n¯∑
j=k¯
b(n¯, j, F (ρk,n)).
Since this condition is identical to condition (5) satisfied by θk¯,n¯(V¯ ), the result
follows.
Proof of Proposition 14. Define V¯ = V/(k − 1). We know from Proposition
7 that θk−1,n−1(V¯ ) → 0 and (n − 1)F (θk−1,n−1(V¯ )) → ∞. This immediately
yields ρk,n(V ) = θk−1,n−1(V¯ )→ 0 and nF (ρk,n(V )) ≥ (n−1)F (θk−1,n−1(V¯ ))→
∞. This proves (i) and (ii). In general, we have Qk,n(V ) 6= Pk−1,n−1(V¯ ) and
thus the behavior of Q cannot simply be concluded from that of P . However,
arguing exactly as in the proof of Proposition 8 we can conclude (iii) from (i)
and (ii).
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